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The Defense Establishment
and the Domestic Economy
Adam Yarmolinsky*
At a time when defense expenditures consume about fifty percent of
the federal tax dollar, the question arises as to how the Department of
Defense can provide the required defense without adversely effecting

the people and institutions it is to protect. In response to the question,
Mr. Yarmolinsky examines three problem areas: the effects of defense
procurement policies, the effects of research and development policies,
and the effects of defense spending generally on the health of American
economy. The author's main point is that the responsibility for absorbing the impact of defense spending must be shared by private industry
as well as by all departments of government.

The first edition of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was published
on the 9th of March, 1776, within four months of the signing of the
Declaration of Independence. It was one of those rare occasions
when history permits something to happen on a convenient date. For
the principles of economics which Adam Smith expounded are an
essential element in the structure and growth of American social
thought, along with the principles of the Declaration of Independence
itself. Their importance and relevance should not be obscured by
the irrelevancies of economic fundamentalists, any more than the
irrelevancies of constitutional fundamentalists can be permitted to
obscure the relevance of constitutional first principles. The arguments
for and against Keynesian economics as applied to budget deficits
should not let us forget that Lord Keynes built on Adam Smith, just
as the arguments for and against Brown v. Board of Education' should
not let us forget that the Brown decision was based on the interpretation of the United States Constitution.
From the beginning, the American genius has been to seek and
maintain a balance, albeit sometimes precarious, between the needs
of the society and the rights of the individual. We make mistakes,
sometimes in one direction and sometimes in the other, but on the
whole, even if we haven't always kept the ship on an even keel, we
have prevented it from capsizing on more than one occasion.
* Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Member of the New York and District of
Columbia bars. The article is based upon an address given February 17, 1965, at the
Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Among the many factors which Americans in our generation must
take into account in this perennial balancing act is the largest peacetime military establishnient in history. Measured in terms of sheer
destructive power, in fact, we now possess by far the greatest aggregation of military force ever assembled by any nation during war or
peace. And in maintaining that force we are encountering a problem
which Adam Smith, in part, anticipated.
In the chapter of his celebrated work devoted to "The Expenses
of the Sovereign or Commonwealth," Smith lists Defense, Justice, and
Public Works-in that order. "The first duty of the sovereign, . . .
that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other
independent societies," he observed, "grows gradually more and more
expensive as the society advances in civilization."2 By that standard,
we are civilized, indeed.
"Among the civilized nations of modem Europe,"-and this is Smith
again, speaking in the year of the American Revolution-"it is commonly computed that not more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers without ruin
3
to the country which pays the expense of their services."
What would have been Smith's reaction-or, for that matter, the
reaction of Washington, Hamilton, or Jefferson-to a situation where
the peacetime costs of defense annually absorbs almost ten percent of
the Gross National Product, as it has for the past decade? Where
more than half of every tax dollar paid into the Federal treasury goes
to defray the costs of our military force structure? Of course, one does
not have to be an Adam Smith to realize that one cannot equate
percentage of total population with percentage of Gross National
Product. And it is not clear that Adam Smith was talking about total
population rather than population of military age. But, in any event,
examining the situation today, I suspect that the reactions of our
ancestors might have been at first incredulous, then appalled, and
finally amazed. Incredulous at the vast size of our defense apparatus;
appalled at the ostensible threat to free institutions inherent in such
a gargantuan establishment; and, finally, amazed at our success in
maintaining both our strength and our freedom. This is an achievement so rare as to be almost unique. And it requires the constant,
dedicated attention of us all to preserve both our strength and our
freedom.
No one, I trust, will mistake my meaning and construe this as a
warning against the Man on Horseback. In North America, at least,
2. 5
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NATIONS 47-77 (1776).
3. Ibid.
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that has never been a serious threat, nor even a serious problem. Our
traditions, our system, and, if you will, our national genius, all militate
against it. During eight recent years, for example, our President was
a career Army officer, a war hero with virtually no professional experience out of uniform before entering the White House. Yet rarely, if
ever, was he accused of trying to aggrandize the military establishment; on the contrary, he was frequently attacked for allegedly subordinating urgent military requirements to political and economic
priorities established by highly-budget-conscious civilians.
The problem, in short, is not so simple as a conflict between military
and civilian ambition-a conflict which is, happily, largely alien to our
society. The real problem is: how can the Department of Defense
perform its critical function of "defending the society from the
violence and injustice of other independent societies" without, at the
same time, affecting adversely the people and institutions it .tries
to protect?
Not only does our present defense establishment have an operating
budget amounting to almost ten percent of the total annual production
of goods and services in the United States. Not only does it consume
almost half the federal tax dollar. It employs directly 3,700,000
Americans-two-thirds of them in uniform. Indirect employment-of
those who depend on defense-related projects for a livelihood-accounts for 6 or 7 million more. These employees, although theoretically engaged in private industry, frequently find themselves involved
with government regulations. The children of servicemen stationed
at military bases place a burden on local school systems, and in compensating (or supplementing) these school systems, the government
becomes involved in processes of education. Defense grants for
scientific research can greatly accelerate progress in those areas that
have military applications-and inadvertently seduce talent and energy
away from the classroom and from other projects equally important,
but irrelevant to defense. The list is endless, and the resulting problems seem almost infinitely complex.
There are three problem areas that I have chosen to examine here,
both for their intrinsic and their illustrative value: the effects of
defense procurement policies on private enterprise within the defense
sector, the effects of defense research and development policies on the
allocation and use of our scientific and engineering resources, and the
effects of defense spending generally on the health of the American
economy.
In each of these areas, the impact of the defense establishment is
very great. But I propose to argue that present policies have significantly reduced the distorting effects of this impact by giving maximum
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scope to private enterprise, and that further reductions must be
achieved primarily by combined efforts of all the leadership elements,
public and private, in our society, to free the resources of private
enterprise for maximum performance.
Let us begin with the defense procurement process. The nature
of modem war, the complexities and the enormous cost of modern
weapons systems, make it inevitable that a large segment of American industry will, throughout the foreseeable future, be involved in
a relationship very different from that which exists between, say, the
producers and consumers of automobiles. There is only one customer
for a new ballistic missile, and, hopefully, no customer at all for
out-of-date models.
The economic model of defense procurement is a long way from
the model of pure competition. With a single buyer purchasing from
a host of sellers, many of whom have no other customers, it is closer
to the model of what the economists call monopsony.
As a monopsonist, the Government is free to choose how much
competition to introduce into the system. In fact, it has already
exercised its first choice in favor of competition by choosing to purchase the development and production of its major weapons systems,
rather than to develop and produce them in government arsenals.
Military establishments have traditionally relied on an arsenal system
for military equipment of a kind which is not also bought and sold
within the civilian economy. But as our military equipment has
grown more complex-and more nearly unique to the military establishment-we have turned more and more to defense industry to
develop and produce this equipment, while systematically cutting back
our remaining arsenals. This trend is in fact one of the major reasons
for the closing of military installations that has created so much noise
and excitement in recent months-and the savings it is producing
should demonstrate the wisdom of these moves.
Once the decision was made to rely primarily on private enterprise
rather than on government arsenals, the Department of Defense, as
the nation's leading monopsonist, had further decisions to make in
determining the role of competition and private initiative, as against
the role of government prescription. First, to what extent should it
select the firms with which it does business by administrative fiat, and
to what extent should it select them by competition? Here the most
significant fact about defense procurement policy is that the percentage of contracts awarded as a result of price competition has increased
from 32.9 per cent in fiscal year 1961 to 39.1 per cent in fiscal year
1964-an increase of 5.3 billion dollars in contracts available to competitive bidders on the basis of price.
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To what extent should the Department rely primarily on detailed
regulation of terms and conditions of work to assure that it gets
maximum performance from its contractors; and to what extent should
it make use of the stimulus of profit and loss, so that the contractual
effort gives greater scope to private enterprise? Here the best indication of the trend is that the percentage of contracts awarded on a
firm fixed-price basis, rather than by reimbursement of the contractor's costs and payment of a fee, has increased from 35.5 per cent in
fiscal year 1961 to just over 50 per cent in the first half of fiscal year
1965.
When the Defense Department is buying a complicated new weapon
system, an airplane or missile, for example, the contractor may be
unable to make a fixed-price proposal, because there are too many
uncertainties in the process of development that lies ahead. One
of the major motivating forces behind many of the improvements in
management practices, from functional budgeting to so-called program definition, has been to reduce these uncertainties. In fact, the
Department of Defense has gone well beyond other agencies of the
Government in tightening up its planning and programming processes.
But even where the uncertainties persist, we have had remarkable
success in providing built-in incentives by awarding cost-reimbursable
contracts with an incentive fee based on cost-saving, time of delivery,
and quality of performance, rather than merely a fixed fee. The percentage of contracts awarded on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis during
the 1961-64 time period has decreased from 38 per cent to 12 per cent
of total contract awards. It is worth bearing in mind also that even
fixed-fee contracts contain real incentives for efficiency, since the fee
is not paid until the work is done, and if the job costs more, the
fixed fee becomes a smaller percentage of the total expenditure by
the contractor.
One of the stubborn facts about a monopsonistic situation is that
once the monopsonist has chosen a particular seller, the other sellers
are out of market. The losers may try to return to the field when
the next contract is ready to be negotiated, but if the contract is for
the development of a complicated weapon system, the firm that gets
the development contract will have an almost unbeatable advantage
when it comes to the production contracts, because it alone will have
built up the specialized capital equipment and know-how that the
system requires. In order to get back to a competitive situation as
soon as possible, defense procurement policies now emphasize breaking out components and spare parts of complicated systems for competitive purchase at the earliest possible date.
The complexity of modem weapons systems raises still another
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obstacle to the free operation of the competitive system. One of the
essential functions to be performed in developing and producing a
new system is that of supervising the integration of all the components, the subsystems and the sub-subsystems, down to the umpteenth level, that go into the final product. To some extent this is a
job for internal defense management itself. But to the extent the
job can and should be done outside the Department, recent history of
defense procurement indicates a good deal of uneasiness among all
of the companies involved about giving one company the special
access to information about all its competitors, and the special relationship with the government purchaser, necessarily involved in the
process of putting the system together. This concern first led to the
organization of special non-profit entities, like the Aerospace Corporation and the Mitre Corporation, which were felt to be more "disinterested" than a profit-making company. The recent articulation of
new conflict of interest rules, essentially to protect competitors against
the danger of any one company acquiring an unfair competitive
advantage because of its supervisory role in a new weapon system
development, has now made it possible to open up even this supervisory function more widely to profit-making private enterprise.
But all these efforts to extend the scope of private initiative in
defense industry are of little value if defense contractors are hedged in
by such onerous conditions and restrictions that they cannot use their
initiative. Of course, defense contractors are subject to a wide range
of detailed regulations, contained in the 2000-odd pages of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation. But it is worth examining
the kind of regulations that the ASPR has to deal with.
First, there are the regulations that are necessary whenever any
contractual parties enter into a cost-reimbursable arrangement. The
definition of allowable costs, particularly in as incredibly complex
an endeavor as, say, the development of a new missile, is well worth
arriving at in advance of particular controversies, as any lawyer can
testify. These regulations are not essentially different from what one
encounters in dealings between large private enterprises entirely in the
private sector.
Second, there are the regulations that are necessary to maintain not
only the fact but the appearance of contractual integrity. The
integrity of the government contracting system is even more precious
to it and the nation than the integrity of a private enterprise. And
government, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. It must
not only behave with complete fairness and propriety, but also it
must be seen to do so. The remarkable fact is not that there are
occasional transgressions, but that, with the enormous volume of
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government business carried on largely by relatively underpaid contracting officers dealing frequently with enormous sums, the transgressions are so few.
The third kind of regulation goes to the role of government in
setting an example for the nation in such matters as providing a safe
place to work, at fair wages and hours, and with equal employment
opportunity for all. Those who deal on behalf of the govermnent
must meet a higher standard than private citizens. The fact is, however, that the standards imposed in government contracts are not
significantly different from those observed by large and visible private
enterprises, even when they are operating entirely on their own.
This is not to say that defense contracting is or should be a means
to achieve indirectly social goals which the government is not prepared to attack directly. There has been a good deal of general
comment about the use of defense dollars to pursue social and economic goals not directly related to defense policy. We can certainly agree
with those authors who assert that "the question [of the impact of
defense procurement] is one of the highest importance to the American
constitutional order, and should, at the very least, be the subject of
detailed and continuing studies by all interested in the proper use
of power in government."4 But such studies will be useful only if
they address themselves to the real problems, which are not always
identical with the a priori assumptions of the investigators.
It has been charged, by various commentators, that decisions are
made to procure military supplies for reasons other than national
security. We hear that the Defense Department is being run as a
WPA for defense industry, that it is being used to further full employment practices, to spur economic growth, or to subsidize certain
large corporations. Simultaneously, representatives of some of those
same large corporations who are supposed to have the inside track
complain that military efficiency is being sacrificed for the sake of
subsidies to small business, or to help economically depressed areas.
The one thing all these, and many similar, indictments have in
common is that they turn on questions of fact. And the facts are
that the sole purpose of defense procurement is, and must be, to
provide the weapons and equipment required for our national security
-and to do so at the lowest sound price. Every Defense Appropriations Act since 1954 has specifically stated that "no funds herein appropriated shall be used for the payment of a price differential on
contracts hereafter made for the purpose of relieving economic dislocations." 5
4. Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency of Federal Procurement Policies,
29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 277, 284-85 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1965, § 523, 78 Stat. 465.
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It is true that there are provisions in the law for set-asides of
portions of defense contracts for small business and labor surplus
areas. But these set-asides may be made only where there is assurance
of sufficient competition to guarantee a fair and reasonable price.
Indeed, what seems to me the essential fallacy in current proposals
to require contracting officers "to take into account" the amount of

work to be performed by prospective contractors in labor surplus areas,
is that none of these proposals provide for putting any dollar value
on the fact that a contract is to be performed where it will help a
particular unemployment problem. And in the absence of a dollar
value, contracting officers have no way to give effect to the legislative
intent, by weighing this cost against other costs. If, on the other
hand, a dollar value were to be provided, the Congress would presumably be unwilling to add those dollars to the defense budget, and
the purpose of the proposal would be defeated.
There is a fundamental difference, therefore, between contractual
requirements which set high standards of performance for prospective
contractors in such areas as wages or conditions of employment, and,
on the other hand, expressions of pious intent in contractual regulations that contracting officers should give some weight to a particular
social value. I respectfully suggest that the latter condition, while it
is scarcely a clog on the contractual process, is of no real practical
effect either.
There are two kinds of regulations that have no business in defense
contracts, or any other kind of government contract for that matter.
The first are unreasonable or wasteful requirements; the second are
unfair requirements, which may be substantively justifiable, but where
the contractor feels he is not being given appropriate procedural
rights. It is the constant effort of defense management to weed out
these two kinds of requirements even before they manage to creep
into the system. In doing so, we might bear in mind the strictures of
Adam Smith on lawyers. Smith wrote:
It has been the custom in modem Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attorneys and clerks of court according to the
number of pages which they had occasion to write; the court, however,
requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line so

many words. In order to increase their payment, the attorneys and clerks

have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption
of the law language or, I believe, every court of justice in Europe. 6

The Air Force has recently taken an imaginative step toward
identifying unreasonable or unfair requirements by putting out a

request for proposals on a particular project in which each prospective
6. Smrnr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 78-98.
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contractor is asked to specify which regulations he would like to have
waived, and how much the waiver of each regulation would be worth
to him in affecting the contract price. Here is a way of giving the
widest scope to private enterprise. What more can a benevolent
monopsonist do?
A second area of frequent concern about the impact of defense
activity is its impact on the use and distribution of our national resources for research and development. These resources of men and
ideas and, particularly in the development phase, elaborate and expensive equipment are the fuel that keeps our economy moving onward
and upward. They spark the increases in individual productivity and
Gross National Product that measure the health of our economy.
Department of Defense projects, together with those of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission, account for more than half of the total research and development activity in this country. In addition to work done in government laboratories, the defense agencies pay for more than half of the
research undertaken in industrial laboratories, and about three-fifths
of the work performed in universities and other non-profit institutions.
For fiscal year 1965, the Department of Defense will be responsible
for two-thirds of all federal support of universities in the field of engineering sciences, and for half of all federal support of university
research in mathematics. In the engineering sciences, where the training for a Ph.D. degree now costs at least 100,000 dollars, universities
are depending upon defense support in the field of graduate education
as their primary support.
Of course, this unprecedented government support for scientific
and engineering research has produced benefits that are not confined
to defense. The fields of engineering science, physics, chemistry, and
mathematics, which receive the greatest share of Defense Department
research grants, for example, are precisely those disciplines that have
had the greatest impact upon all technologically oriented industrywhether or not defense-related-during the past twenty years.
The present American leadership in civilian jet aircraft production
can be traced to advances sponsored by Defense research. In the past
decade, few civilian aircraft developments have recovered their development costs without the contribution of defense-sponsored research.
Nearly all aspects of the computer industry have their origins in
Defense-supported programs. Beginning with work done by the
University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, and MIT, the Department of
Defense has provided the basic support for most of the major innovations which have made possible the widespread exploitation of
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computers. Similarly, Department of Defense support of the peculiar
new variety of mathematics associated with computers has greatly
affected both the range of problems computers can deal with, and
even the teaching of mathematics itself.
One cause of concern, however, arises from the lop-sided nature of
the government's investment. In contrast to the support provided
for such fields as engineering, physics, and mathematics, for example,
defense-oriented funds account for only three per cent of federal
support to universities for the social sciences and two per cent for
biology.
This is not to argue that defense funds for research and development should be redistributed more equitably among the natural and
social sciences. The distribution of these funds must be determined
by the needs of the defense establishment-with adequate attention
to the future as well as to the pressing demands created by today's
problems. The real problem is not that biologists or social scientists
fail to find as much support for their activities from the Defense
Department as high energy physicists do. Even within the Government, after all, there are other sources of funds-the National Science
Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the cooperative research
programs of many departments and agencies. The real cost to our
society of defense-supported research is that the human resources
drawn upon for defense are not available for other purposes. Industries like housing and textiles and machine tools, which lag behind
the rest of the economy in their investment in research and development, and hence in their productivity, are further discouraged by the
vigor of competing claims on scarce research and development resources. The so-called "fall-out" from military research and development is clearly of less benefit to the civilian economy than the full
availability of the resources that produced this fall-out. Despite the
significant and tangible benefits to the civilian community, we would
undoubtedly have obtained much more and at less cost if we had
devoted comparable research and training resources directly to civilian
purposes.
But prospects for the future are increasingly bright. Barring a major
change in the international situation, it should not be necessary to
increase the level of defense spending in the years immediately ahead.
This levelling off is possible because we are now reaping the benefits
of the greatly increased investments in defense over the past four
years, and also of the vigorous cost reduction program introduced
into the Defense Department three years ago by Secretary McNamara.
Our Gross National Product is now expanding at the rate of some
five per cent each year. Thus, without a reduction in our military
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force structure, if defense spending can be kept to the same dollar, level
as today, it will represent a smaller and smaller proportion of our
annual production of goods and services. And while the Defense
program has held down the number of scientists and- engineers
available for non-defense purposes in the past, it also has contributed
substantially to expanding the training of scientists and engineers
through the support given to universities and students. They will
constitute a significant base on which to build in the future.
The real challenge is to the non-defense sector of our economy
to marshal the human and material resources so that we can make
the same kind of technological progress in the key non-defense areas
that has been possible in missiles and radars and nuclear propulsion.
This challenge leads us to our third problem area, the impact of
defense spending on the health of the economy.
The argument is often advanced that our current prosperity depends on the continued maintenance or even the expansion of a 50
billion dollar defense budget- a budget that has been plowing some
20 billion dollars of procurement into the economy every year for the
last four or five years. This concern would surely be justified if a
gradual reduction or even levelling off of the defense budget were
not accompanied by any increase of spending in other sectors of the
economy, public or private. I cannot believe, however, that the
tremendous unmet needs for more and better education, housing,
transportation and other social services cannot more than take up
any slack in the economy resulting from a levelling off of defense
expenditure. Whether they do so in fact will depend in large part
on the skillful management of fiscal and monetary policies in pursuit
of the goals of the Great Society.
But even if the slack is fully taken up, there are problems of transition that remain a special concern of the Department of Defense.
Whenever a contract is terminated, whenever procurement of a
particular piece of equipment is abandoned, whenever a base is closed,
people will be changing jobs, equipment will be idled, at least temporarily, and local merchants will lose customers.
Indeed one can argue that defense contractors should be more concerned about specific shifts in defense spending, rather than about the
overall trend in the defense budget. Because if there is a shift away
from a particular product or service, it is cold comfort for the contractor to know that another part of the defense budget may be
increasing, perhaps even by a larger margin than the decrease in his
area.
The Defense Department has taken several steps to reduce the
impact of shifts in defense spending. It is in the process of establishing
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a kind of early warning system, first to measure more accurately the
impact of defense spending on industry by type and even by location,
and then to predict, at least in a general way and subject to the
vagaries of competition, what the effect of anticipated changes in
defense spending will be across the spectrum of the economy. It
has also established an Office of Economic Adjustment, specifically
designed to help communities and, to some extent, industries which
are hit by contract cancellations or base closings, and to mobilize all
the resources of federal, state and local governments to help the
victims to get back on their feet economically.
The fact is, however, that too many defense contractors tend to
think of themselves as having only one potential customer-the Department of Defense. They reject the idea of diversification as beyond
their capabilities. And this may be so. One of the virtues of our
system is that it is flexible enough to permit the break-up of some
industrial entities and the formation of new ones as a part of the
process of economic change. Thurman Arnold's famous essay on the
virtues of bankruptcy is in point here.7 But I suspect that some of
these companies have more inherent flexibility than they are willing
to give themselves credit for.
A large aerospace company, for example, is not only an aggregate
of teams of specialists in building airplanes and missiles. It is also
an aggregate of teams of specialists in putting together very complicated systems, composed typically of many layers of subsystems, subsubsystems, and so forth. The industry has even coined a word for the
process of joining systems: it is called the interface problem. There
are problems outside of national defense, for example, in designing
an urban and interurban transportation system, or a better mass
education system, to which many of the techniques of defense industry, in dealing with complex interfaces, could well be applied.
Most of these problems lie in the public sector, and they must attain
quite a respectable size to be appropriate for the kind of handlingand, some would say, the kind of overhead-that defense industry
is accustomed to provide. But they exist, and they ought to be looked
at by defense industry managers.
There is a good deal of current debate about the future of defense
industry. Some of the more optimistic suggestions have a disturbingly
utopian tone to them.
The fact is, however, that some defense firms have made at least
tentative moves to diversify into the non-defense sector. Aerojet
General, for example, has recently entered into a 100,000 dollar con7. ARNoLD, THE FOLxLORE OF CAPITALISM 230-62

(1939).
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tract with the State of California to develop long-range plans for air
and water pollution control.
At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind, as Gardner Ackley
pointed out recently,
It is probably correct to say that our national goals do not include nor even
imply the preservation of particular companies. If defense firms can successfully diversify or convert the productive resources they presently employ

to civilian production whenever the demand for their defense products
declines, these firms can and should maintain their present scale of opera-

tions or continue to grow. But such firms have no particular claim to
maintain their present size.8

To suggest otherwise would threaten the integrity of the free enterprise system.
The important thing is that the resources of labor, of scientific and
engineering talent, and of capital, continue to be available for new
purposes.
My main point here, as in connection with the other two problem
areas I have discussed, is that the responsibility for absorbing the
impact of defense spending on the health of the economy must be
shared by the managers of private industry itself, as well as by all
departments of the Government.
Lastly, a word about the role of lawyers in maintaining the delicate
balance between the demands of national security and the vision of
the Great Society.
It may well be that our ability to be simultaneously both the freest
people and the greatest military power in history results in large part
from an ingrained reverence for due process and orderly procedure.
For more than two decades, we have maintained a military establishment which is both huge and ubiquitous-reaching, as we have seen,
into almost every corner of American life-and yet we are not a
garrison state.
The American Revolution has been called a lawyer's revolution.
Certainly, even a cursory reading of the Declaration of Independence
and the first ten amendments reveals a lawyer's concern with procedure. As justice Douglas has written:
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference

between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to
strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal

justice under law.9

8. Address by Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, New

England Conference on Opportunities and Problems of Defense Conversions, Boston,
Mass., September 21, 1964.
9. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951)

curring opinion).

(con-
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As in the political sphere, so in the economic sphere the key to
workable relations is due process, not only recognizing the rights of the
parties, but giving scope to the potentialities of individual enterprise
and energy on which all progress depends.
And lawyers are above all the guardians of due process. As legislators, as judges, as officers of the court, we are charged to apply the
powers of reason to the reconciliation of conflicting interests so that
wen can work, not against each other, but together towards our common goals.
President Johnson described this process as well as anyone has,
when he told us in his Inaugural Address that the Great Society is
"the excitement of becoming-always becoming, trying, probing, falling, resting, and trying again-but always trying and always gaining."

